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MCTAGGART AND THE UNREALITY OF TIME 
Rögnvaldur Ingthorsson 
John M.E. McTaggart’s (1866-1925) famous argument for the unreality of 
time really is a peculiar artefact in the history of philosophy. Despite that 
McTaggart’s conclusion has been generally rejected, his views on tense has 
been widely accepted, e.g. in modern tense-logic.1 His terms for the different 
ways events appear to be positioned in time, the A- and B-series, have even 
come to be used to characterise the two dominating views in the philosophy 
of time today: the A- and B-view of time, or as is often said, the tensed and 
tenseless view of time.  
McTaggart distinguished between two ways that events appear to be 
positioned in time and claimed that they implied quite different ontological 
conceptions of time. On the one hand events are earlier than and later than 
each other, and on the other hand events are either future, present or past. 
McTaggart claimed that events hold permanent positions in terms of being 
earlier than and later than each other, but were continuously changing their 
positions in terms of being first future, then present, and finally past. Taken 
separately, both ways imply a conception of time as being constituted by a 
series of positions. McTaggart chose to call that series whose positions are 
determined only as earlier and later than each other the B-series, but the 
series whose positions are determined as future, present and past the A-
series.  
The so called A- and B-views correspond crudely to McTaggart’s A- and 
B-series in the way that the B-view denies that the distinction of time into 
future, present and past are objective features and holds that the relations of 
earlier than and later than are the fundamental characteristics of time. The B-
view claims that the experience of now and the transitory relation of events 
to now is a mere subjective creation. The A-view, on the other hand, holds 
that the apparent transition from future to past through the present is the 
fundamental characteristic of time and an objective feature of reality in some 
way or another. 
                                                
1 Needham (1975, p. 1). 
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A second more controversial part of McTaggart’s argument is his claim 
that because the relations of the B-series are permanent it cannot on its own 
account for change and, assuming change to be an essential characteristic of 
time, that the B-series could therefore not be properly characterised as 
temporal. According to McTaggart the positions of the B-series were 
dependent on the reality of the A-series for being in time at all. 
A third equally controversial part is the claim that the change of positions 
in A-series fashion involves a contradiction and that time must therefore be 
unreal. It is the ontological nature of this alleged contradiction that is the 
subject of this paper. A naive form of the contradiction can initially be stated 
like this: 
1. Future, present and past are incompatible properties, but  
2. in time every event appears to possess them all, and  
3. these two propositions entail the contradiction that events have 
incompatible properties. 
The proponents of the B-view tend to accept McTaggart’s claim that the A-
series entails a contradiction but reject that the B-series does not contain 
change.2 The proponents of the A-view have on the other hand rejected 
McTaggarts claim that the A-series entails a contradiction and claim that 
they cannot see that he, or the proponents of the B-view, gives any 
satisfactory justification for this claim.  
2. The A- and B-views on the notion of succession 
Nathan Oaklander has suggested that the disagreement between the A- and 
B-view on McTaggart’s claim that the A-series entails a contradiction 
revolves around the ontological status of succession.3 Oaklander, himself a 
proponent of the B-view, refers to the debate between himself and Quentin 
Smith, a proponent of the A-view, as being representative for this 
disagreement. Oaklander argues that Smith cannot account for the 
successive possession of incompatible temporal properties: “Smith simply 
                                                
2 Whether or not the B-series does contain change is a controversial issue that cannot 
be addressed properly here. I will be content with simply stating McTaggart’s claims on 
this issue.  
3 Oaklander (1996)  
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claims that an appeal to succession avoids the contradiction that McTaggart 
finds in temporal attributions, but he does not offer an argument.”4 And 
Smith rebuts: “But Oaklander gives no justification for this assumption. Like 
McTaggart he simply asserts that whatever possesses the three temporal 
properties must possess them simultaneously.”5  
Both Smith and Oaklander recognise that the arguments of both sides are 
in some sense incommensurable to the view of the other on this matter: 
Indeed, a reader of the literature on McTaggart’s paradox might well come 
away with an impression of futility, a sense that the debate repeatedly ends in 
the same impasse, with the tensers predictably making a certain move and the 
detensers predictably responding with a certain countermove.6 
The situation can be summarised like this. The B-view demands that the A-
view gives a plausible account of the successive possession of temporal 
properties while the A-view demands that the B-view justifies that there is a 
problem with this kind of succession at all. This is a curious stalemate 
situation and I think it might be interesting to consider again the reasons why 
McTaggart claimed that the A-series entails a contradiction and 
consequently rejected both views.  
I will attempt to show that McTaggart’s claim that the A-series entails a 
contradiction is neither wholly unfounded nor obscure, by showing how his 
idealistic ontology of the general nature of the existent and real guides his 
reasoning in every step of the argument for the unreality of time. This has to 
the best of my knowledge never been done. The argument for the unreality 
of time in The Nature of Existence (NE)7 has always been treated by 
commentators as a self-contained argument independent of the rest of 
McTaggart’s ontological system.8 I will try to show that this is a mistake, 
and that it is because of this that McTaggart’s reasons for claiming that the 
A-series entails a contradiction have been considered to be obscure. 
McTaggart himself clearly intended the argument and its conclusion, which 
                                                
4 Oaklander (1994, p. 195). 
5 Smith, (1993, p. 174). 
6 Smith (1994a, p. 202). 
7 McTaggart (1988) 
8 This is the case even with C.D. Broad in his admirable Examination of McTaggart’s 
Philosophy (1938, vol. 1, p. 9). 
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is in vol.2 [of NE], to be treated as dependent on the ontology that he had 
presented in vol.1. I have no ambitions, nor hope, in proving him right, but I 
hope that my account may provide some kind of clarification that may be 
useful in making the debate between the proponents of the A- and B-views 
regarding the alleged contradiction of the A-series less incommensurable. 
But I am afraid it is not going to be an easy reading. McTaggart’s argument 
has been muddling the brains of philosophers for some 90 years now, which 
indicates that it is indeed no easy matter.9  
3. The structure of McTaggart’s reasoning in The Nature of Existence 
The argument for the unreality of time is to be found in the beginning of the 
second volume of NE.10 In the first volume of that work McTaggart 
‘determines’ the nature of the existent in general without, as he claims, 
taking anything specifically existing into consideration.11 McTaggart 
himself characterizes his ontology as an idealistic ontology in the spirit of 
Berkeley, Leibniz and Hegel.12 In the second volume, however, he looks at 
certain empirical features of existing entities, e.g. that they all appear to be 
temporal and some of them material. Both features are such, he concludes, 
that they can impossibly belong to anything really existing, according to the 
general nature of the existent and real that he determined in the first volume 
of NE:  
It will be possible to show that, having regard to the general nature of the 
existent as previously determined, certain characteristics, that we consider 
here for the first time, cannot be true of the existent[...]13  
This structure of NE is made exquisitely clear by McTaggart but is 
apparently overlooked by most readers of the argument for the unreality of 
time. I believe that this is the main reason why the outlook of McTaggart’s 
argument is still a subject of controversy.  
                                                
9 McTaggart first presented his thoughts on this matter in an article in Mind in 1908 
(1934). I will however only discuss the mature version of it contained in (1988). 
10 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, Ch. 33)  
11 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, Ch. 3). 
12 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 52). 
13 [italics are mine, RI], McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 298). McTaggart makes an 
almost identical statement in vol.1, sect. 54. 
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The purpose of this paper is to provide the reader with a short account of 
the fundamentals in McTaggart’s ontology and to show how it affects the 
argument for the unreality of time, especially how it relates to the alleged 
contradiction of the A-series. I hope that this will contribute to a deeper 
understanding of McTaggart’s argument. But first we must get better 
aquainted with the argument and its baffling conclusion. 
4. A short reconstruction of the argument 
As mentioned earlier McTaggart distinguished between two ways that events 
are believed to be positioned in time and claimed that they implied two quite 
different ontological conceptions of time. The way events are perceived to 
be simultaneous with certain events, earlier than some other events and later 
than the rest, gives us a conception of a series of positions that runs like 
beads on a string from earlier to later or conversely, i.e. the B-series. Events 
are also perceived to be either future, present or past and this gives us a 
conception of a series of positions that runs from the far future to the 
present, and from the present to the distant past, or conversely, i.e. the A-
series. It might seem strange to describe the A-series to run from future to 
past or conversely, and it must therefore be noted that it is not the positions 
that change positions, but the events. The fundamental difference between 
the two series are that while events appear to change their positions in 
respect of A-series positions, from future, to present and to past, then their 
positions in terms of B-series positions are permanent and do not change; no 
event is at one time earlier than some other event and at another time later 
than that same event.14 McTaggart assumed that time is universally believed 
to involve change, and because he could not detect any change in the B-
series he concluded that it could not properly be called temporal.15 The A-
series however at least appears to involve change; the transition of events 
from the future to the present and into the past.16  
McTaggart claimed that future, present, and past are clearly relations and 
not qualities, although, like all relations, they generate relational qualities in 
                                                
14 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 305-306). 
15 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 309-310). 
16 For an account of other possible kinds of changes and how McTaggart rules them 
out see (McTaggart 1988, vol.2, sect. 309-315). 
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the entities they relate.17 But he could not determine as to what entity 
exactly the events stood in these relations and consequently to what they 
changed their relations to. McTaggart began to look for this change in the 
relations that hold between the events in the series but concluded that it is 
not to be found there. Every event in the A-series is changing its positions 
uniformly in the same direction, which can be seen by the permanence of 
their B-series relations; no event is first future, then present and finally past 
in relation to another event. McTaggart claimed that the same problem arises 
when saying that it is relations to moments of time or positions of time that 
change, if these are taken as separate entities, because these are entities that 
themselves must aquire their temporal properties through a relation.18  
McTaggart came to the conclusion that the A-series is dependent on some 
thing or other outside the series to which the entities in the series, whatever 
they may be, events or moments of time, change their relation to, but which 
itself does not change.19 McTaggart did not himself introduce the notion of 
‘now’ as this something outside the series. He rested content in saying that it 
would not be easy to find such a term, but there must exist one if the A-
series is to be real. But even if the existence of such an entity was granted, 
and thereby the reality of the relational properties of future, present and past, 
there remains a contradiction he claimed.20  
Future, present and past are then taken as relational properties that events 
possess by holding a relation to something unknown, whether this is some 
sort of container-time, a now or whatever, is left unsaid. They are however 
incompatible temporal positions because nothing can be future, present and 
past in relation to the same thing all at once. And yet in time as a whole 
every event has them all, and this, McTaggart claims, involves a 
                                                
17 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 326-328. 
18 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 327).  
19 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 327). 
20 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 328). Broad believed that McTaggart considered the 
necessary existence of an unknown entity to be a convincing but not conclusive reason to 
accept the other parts of his argument, Broad calls this the Subsidiary Argument (Broad 
1938, vol.2, pp. 317-318). Nevertheless, McTaggart proceeds, for the sake of argument, 
assuming the existence of such an entity in relation to which the members of the series 
hold the simple relational properties of futurity, presentness and pastness (see also 
(McTaggart 1988, vol. 2, footnote 1, p. 22).  
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contradiction. It is at this point readers usually begin to be baffled and even 
resentful. Events, it is objected, are never future, present and past 
simultaneously, but well enough successively, and in that there is no 
contradiction. This is indeed Broad’s main reason for rejecting McTaggart’s 
conclusion: 
I cannot myself see that there is any contradiction to be avoided. When it is 
said that pastness, presentness and futurity are incompatible predicates, this is 
true only in the sense that no one term could have two of them simultaneously 
or timelessly. Now no term ever appears to have any of them timelessly, and 
no term ever appears to have any of them simultaneously. What appears to be 
the case is that certain terms have them successively. Thus there is nothing in 
the temporal appearances to suggest that there is a contradiction to be 
avoided.21  
Well, it is at least clear from the text in NE that McTaggart was perfectly 
aware of the fact that events do not appear to be nor are believed to be 
future, present and past simultaneously but well enough successively:  
It may seem that this can be easily explained. Indeed, it has been impossible 
to state the difficulty without almost giving the explanation, since our 
language has verb-forms for the past, present, and future, but no form that is 
common to all three. It is never true, the answer will run, that M is present, 
past, and future. It is present, will be past, and has been future. [...] The 
characteristics are only incompatible when they are simultaneous, and there is 
no contradiction to this in the fact that each term has all of them 
successively.22  
It seems then that his reasons stem from some other source than a simple 
mistake in analysing the experience of time or the proper rules of temporal 
predication. He is aware that events never appear to hold the temporal 
positions simultaneously but well enough successively, he is aware that 
language does not imply that an event has all three tenses simultaneously, 
and yet he claims that a proposition about any event e that it ‘has been 
future, is present and will be past,’ implies that e has them all and that this 
involves a contradiction. Why does Broad, Smith and other A-view 
proponents see succession as a simple solution to the contradiction while 
McTaggart and B-view proponents like Oaklander do not, even when the 
appearance of succession is an admitted empirical phenomenon by all?  
                                                
21 Broad (1938, vol.2, p. 313). 
22 McTaggart (1988, vol. 2, sect. 330). 
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The B-view is in fact committed to accept one sense of successive 
possession of properties; the possession of different properties at different 
times. Hugh Mellor even goes so far as saying: “A change, then, is a thing 
having incompatible real properties at different times.”23 But if the 
proponents of the B-view can admit that a thing can change in the sense of 
first being red at t and then not red but, lets say blue, at t’, thus having in 
succession, or at different times, properties that are clearly incompatible, 
why can they not accept that an event can first be future and then present? 
Well the answer is that the B-view accepts the possession of incompatible 
properties as long as they are possessed one at a time. The contradiction 
involved in having A-series temporal properties, according to the B-view, is 
that events never possess any simple A-series temporal characteristic at any 
single time t, but always a combination of the three incompatible properties 
future, present and past, at any time. This could be made clear by 
McTaggart’s views on beliefs that “[...]assert that the presence of one 
characteristic implies the presence of another”.24 On his view anything 
possessing the characteristic of being a unilateral triangle implies that it has 
an angle sum of 180°, which entails no contradiction. Now, being blue does 
never imply the possession of being red, or any other incompatible property, 
but being either future, present or past always implies the possession of the 
other two; an event that is future is in a sense determined to possess the 
property of being present and past. Future events are bound to become 
present, which in a sense implies that presentness inheres in the event at the 
same time that it is future, and so does pastness.25 Succession is of course no 
                                                
23 [italics are mine, R.I.] Mellor (1981, p. 110). Mellor’s account of change is in line 
with how Russell once defined change: “Change is the difference, in respect of truth or 
falsehood, between a proposition concerning an entity and a time T and a proposition 
concerning the same entity and another time T’, provided that the two propositions differ 
only by the fact that T occurs in the one where T’ occurs in the other.” (1972, p. 469). 
Mellor however claims that it:“[...] will not do to define change as variation through time, 
if time itself can only be defined as the dimension of change.” Mellor therefore proposes 
that change must be explained in terms of causation, but without accepting the reality of 
tenses (Mellor 1981, p. 7-8). 
24 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 26-31). 
25 Smith proposes a tensed theory of such inherences, admits that there is an infinite 
regress of inherence relations, but claims that it is not vicious. A full account of Smith’s 
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solution to the contradiction of having at every moment different 
combinations of incompatible characteristics but there is controversy 
regarding the claim that this kind of implication is equal to actually 
possessing the implied characteristic.  
It seems then that the B-view of time is dependent on showing that 
successive possession of temporal properties is not possible because they, as 
opposed to other properties, can never be had one at a time. The B-view 
must show that if anything has one of them it has them all. The 
disagreement, then, between the A-and B-view is not about succession in 
general but whether or not temporal properties can be possessed in the usual 
sense of succession. This provides us with an interesting contrast to 
McTaggart. To him it is equally contradictory that a substance has 
incompatible colour properties in succession as having temporal properties 
in succession. He would claim that the incompatible properties really 
belonged to numerically distinct substances that were parts of a compound 
substance, united by some common property, other than colour, and that this 
compound substance was misperceived as changing although in reality its 
parts have always possessed these properties and always will possess them. 
So to me it seems that in relation to McTaggart the B-view will have to 
provide an account of the possibility of change that allows the possession of 
incompatible properties other than tenses. Mellor, for one, argues that 
causation will do the job.26 
5. The infinite regress of temporal properties 
In sect. 332 of NE vol.2, McTaggart claims that if it was objected that 
temporal properties were not had simultaneously but successively it would 
unavoidably result in a vicious infinite regress of ever more complex 
combinations of incompatible tenses. This section, and adjoining sections, is 
apparently believed to be the key sections of the whole argument. Modern 
writers like Mellor and Michael Dummett have provided defences of the 
soundness of McTaggart’s infinite regress argument, but I will attempt to 
                                                                                                                                            
theory is found in (1993). For a comprised account of his views on the infinite regress see 
Smith (1994b, 180-194).  
26 Mellor (1981, p. 8). 
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explain the contradiction without invoking this line of reasoning.27 I believe 
that my account is logically independent of it. My explanation only assumes, 
as I believe McTaggart does, that the notion of successive possession of A-
series temporal properties presupposes that at some point t1 in time an event 
e actually is future, at some point t2 in time e actually is present, and at some 
point t3 in time e actually is past. I assume that all can accept this to be 
necessary truth conditions for speaking truly about the successivity of 
futurity, presentness and pastness; if an event e never ‘is future’ it can never 
be ‘has been future’ either, and if e never ‘is present’ it can never be ‘will be 
past’, and if e never ‘is past’ it will always be false that e ‘will be past’. I 
will attempt to show how the presupposition of just these three necessary 
facts entails a contradiction, if McTaggart’s ontology is presupposed.  
The proposed explanation is consequently not open to objections that 
tenses are possessed successively, or to objections that sentences like ‘has 
been future’ only appear to imply simultaneous possession of incompatible 
tenses (e.g. being future now) when failing to recognise the proper nature of 
temporal predication. Expressions like ‘will be past’ do for instance not refer 
to the present, but to some other time when e possesses a different property 
than it does at the time the expression is uttered. E.J. Lowe and Evan Fales, 
among others, have claimed that McTaggart’s problem is based on a 
confusion concerning the indexical nature of predicates like ‘present’ and 
‘now’. They claim that the indexical nature of these predicates enables us to 
pick out successive moments in time.28 But McTaggart is in fact assuming 
that the reality of time is dependent on the truth of what they are claiming, 
i.e. that it is necessary that events possess temporal predicates successively, 
and that language does appear to pick out the times when events possess this 
and that temporal property. It is the existence of the reality thus described by 
language that he is rejecting because it is in conflict with the ontology that 
he has previously determined. My explanation will focus on how the notion 
of time, as involving the successive possession of temporal properties by 
events, clash with what McTaggart thinks is the necessary characteristics of 
anything existing and real. At this point let it suffice to say that McTaggart’s 
                                                
27 Mellor (1981, pp. 92-102) & Dummett (1960). 
28 Lowe (1987) & Fales (1990, p. 265). 
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ontology requires that time, as well as every other really real entity, must be 
shown to be an existing whole, a substance, or compound substance 
constituted by coexisting parts, if it is to be real at all. If every event is then 
supposed to have at least three incompatible positions in such a coexisting 
whole, i.e. positions they cannot coexist in, how can the positions be 
coexistent constituents of time? Well, they cannot! It would require that 
every event had three coexistent incompatible temporal properties and that 
involves a contradiction. 
Usually we need an answer to a problem, but in this case we need to 
explain what the problem is in order to understand the answer. In order to 
fully understand this explanation we must first become familiar with the 
fundamental principles in McTaggarts ontology and use it to clarify the 
ontological status of the notions of event, position, series of positions, 
moments of time, and their mutual relations in McTaggart’s philosophy.  
6. McTaggart’s ontology: Criteria of reality for time as a ‘series’29 
To acquire proper understanding of McTaggart’s train of thought it is 
necessary to become familiar with his ontology of the nature of the existent. 
There is no room for a thorough exposition of his argumentation on this 
matter. I will only present relevant conclusions about the nature of such 
notions as existence, reality, substance, property and relation in the form of 
postulates and only provide a short clarification when needed. I will also 
present his views on how our beliefs relate to the real facts they are about. 
This involves notions like belief, assumption, fact, truth and falsity. When 
this is done I will try to show how McTaggart’s views on these matters 
determines his conclusion about the nature of time. McTaggart himself 
believed these notions to be indefinable, i.e. only ideally determinable, and 
much of what he proposes to adopt about them to be widely accepted.30 
Reality admits of no degrees; either something is real or it is not.31 We 
often say that something can be real for someone without really admitting 
that this something exists. We might grant someone to have had an 
experience of seeing a ghost even if we do not believe that ghosts really 
                                                
29 For a critique of McTaggart’s ontology see, Broad (1938) & Airaksinen (1975) 
30 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 2, 60, 67 & 78).  
31 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 2, Ch. 1 & 2). 
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exists. The ghost is therefore only real for someone in the sense that the 
experience of seeing a ghost exists as a mental state in a consciousness while 
the subject of that experience does not correspond to anything objectively 
real in the world. 
Existence is coextensive with the real; everything that exists is real, and 
there can be nothing real that does not exist. Even if this was false, i.e. that 
something was real that did not exist, it would be of no practical 
consequence to us.32 There is therefore no sphere of possible existents that 
have not yet been realised; existence does not admit of degrees either.33 
Possibilities, other than those simply informing about our ignorance of what 
actually does obtain, are always assertions about the implication of one 
characteristic by another and then correspond to existing facts.34  
That which exists must have some other nature than existence, viz. it 
must have properties.35 The existence of properties presupposes the 
existence of substances that holds the properties; there can never exist a 
property without substance and there can not be any substances without 
properties: 
Something must exist, then, and have qualities, without being itself either a 
quality or a relation. And this is Substance[...] This is the traditional 
definition of substance, and it is the one I propose to adopt.36 
Substances can form groups by force of a common property and every such 
group is a compound substance.37 Every human individual is e.g. a 
substance, but they also stand in a special relation to all other human 
individuals through their common property of being human and thus form 
the compound substance ‘humankind’. Events are a class of substances 
having properties and holding relations.38  
All substances stand in relation to every other substance in one way or 
the other, and only between them, or their properties, can there be 
                                                
32 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 6 & Ch. 2).  
33 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 35 & 40).  
34 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 35). 
35 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 59). 
36 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 67). 
37 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, Ch. 14, 15 & 16). 
38 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 5 & vol. 2, sect. 306).  
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relations.39 All substances in the whole Universe thus make up a single 
compound substance and all determine one another.40 Reality is in this sense 
the totality of all existing substances, the properties they hold and the 
relations they stand in. This is the sense in which McTaggart means that all 
‘changes’, however minor, determines the nature of all substances in the 
Universe.41 The fall of a sand-castle on the English coast determines the 
nature of the Great Pyramid because their mutual relation is part of their 
nature. According to McTaggart substances possess negative properties and 
can determine other substances and be related by them no less than through 
positive properties.42  
One should notice that the formation of compound substances, in 
McTaggart’s sense, is by no means restricted to substances co-present in 
time and space and one should therefore not associate them with ‘things’ in 
the usual sense.43  
I must also stress the point that even though properties and relations are 
in a sense universal, in McTaggart’s account, they cannot have independent 
existence, i.e. there cannot exist a real relation ‘larger than’ per se, if nothing 
really is larger than something else. We might however be able to have an 
idea of such a relation even if it did not really exist but then it would be an 
idea of something unreal. From this follows that there cannot be any real 
relations to non-existing entities.44 There can e.g. not exist any real relations 
to mythical creatures like the Phoenix, but we can imagine them and then the 
idea of the Phoenix, as well as the idea of the relation we imagine it to have 
to us and other things, exists as a mental state in our consciousness. It might 
be objected that we seem to be able to have a relation in time to not yet 
existing or not any more existing things, i.e. to the conference we will attend 
next week or to deceased relatives. It will however become clear that on 
McTaggart’s account it is a mistake to treat not-present things as not 
                                                
39 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect.78-79). 
40 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 135, 137, 138). 
41 Of course meaning apparent changes, (McTaggart 1988, vol. 2, footnote 1, p. 
347).  
42 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 61) 
43 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 59 & 130). 
44 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, Ch. 8). 
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existing: “Now tomorrow’s weather is existent, for existence is as much a 
predicate of the future and past as of the present.”45 On McTaggart’s view 
relations presuppose something existing as having a relation and if 
temporality is a relation then it requires the existence of what it relates.  
Now we have the foundation of the structure that McTaggart applies to 
what he calls ‘Absolute Reality’.46 It is a world constituted by substances, 
their properties and the relations that hold between them. The Universe is 
one single compound substance. The parts of this compound substance are 
not only the things or matter in the Universe as obtain at each moment of 
time but every qualitatively distinguishable entities of any kind in the entire 
history of the Universe, not forgetting the qualitative states of our 
consciousnesses. Each and all are substantially existing entities joined by 
relations. This is indeed the view from eternity. But something must be said 
of the relation between Absolute Reality and our beliefs about it. 
Beliefs are mental states that assert that something is true of reality, they 
must therefore always be either true or false.47 Mental states are real 
qualitative states of a consciousness and consciousnesses are substances.48 
Truth is a relation of correspondence between beliefs about reality and 
facts.49 Facts are:“[...]either the possession by anything of a property, or the 
connection of anything with anything by a relation.”50 That is to say, facts 
consist of independently existing substances having properties and which 
hold real relations to other independently existing substances. It is important 
to realise that McTaggart here uses fact as a universal term for any existing 
state of affairs, regardless if they appear to be, or are believed to be, events, 
things, thoughts or whatever, as long as they consist in independently 
existing substances having properties and holding relations. This is a use that 
may be confusing. Especially if one is used to treating facts as true 
propositions that can be true about states of affairs, and even such as do not 
                                                
45 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, footnote 1, p. 7). 
46 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 296). 
47 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 8). 
48 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 433). 
49 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 10). 
50 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 10). 
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obtain or exist.51 In McTaggart’s terminology facts are not in any way 
distinct from the state of affairs that exist and beliefs can never be true about 
non-existent states of affairs (see above about truth).52  
McTaggart’s view of facts bears close resemblance to the view of ‘states 
of affairs’ held by later Cambridge philosophers, but, contrary to e.g. the 
early Wittgenstein, McTaggart does not allow for the reality of possible, or 
non-existent, states of affairs.53 There exists no negative facts in 
McTaggart’s ontology although substances possess negative properties.54 
Falsity is instead the absence of a relation of correspondence between a 
belief and any real fact.55 Truth, in McTaggart’s sense, is purely 
metaphysical, not epistemological, it holds whether or not you know there is 
a relation of correspondence or not. 
                                                
51 McTaggart goes to great length in showing that the truth and falsity of beliefs do 
not presuppose the reality of true and false propositions, but only a direct relation 
between belief and existing facts (McTaggart 1988, vol.1, ch.2). 
52 At times McTaggart speaks as if facts are something that are ‘about’ states affairs 
and thus implying that they are distinct from them, but it should be clear that this is only 
a manner of speaking that he allows himself to indulge in, for the sake of convenience, 
when he has already given the meaning of the term. 
53 McTaggart’s account of facts is very similar to that of the logical atomists: “The 
most general account given by the atomists of an atomic fact was that it was a fact 
consisting either in the possession by a particular of a characteristic or in a relation 
holding between two or more particulars”, (Urmson 1960, p. 17). Wittgenstein however, 
in his Tractatus, saw a fact as always consisting of at least two things forming a state of 
affairs: “2. What is the case -a fact- is the existence of states of affairs. / 2.01 A state of 
affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)”, (Wittgenstein 1961, p. 7). 
In a translation of Tractatus from 1922 by C.K. Ogden and F.P. Ramsey Wittgenstein’s 
Sachverhalten is translated with ‘atomic facts’(Wittgenstein 1922), whereas in the 
translation cited above of D.F.Pears & B.F. McGuinness in 1961, it is translated with 
‘states of affairs’. The change of terminology from fact to state of affairs is motivated, I 
assume, because a Sachverhalt, a state of affairs, is something that can be real without 
actually existing, while a Tatsache, a fact, is a Sachverhalt or Sachlage that exists in 
actuality. A state of affairs in Wittgenstein is therefore something that can be real as a 
possibility without actually existing, while a fact is a state of affairs that exists. This is a 
distinction not allowed by McTaggart, and I therefore use ‘state of affairs' as synonymous 
with fact.  
54 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 62). 
55 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 19). 
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7. The Universe is a compound substance, but can it be temporal? 
McTaggart believed that everything we know empirically appeared to be in 
time, and he wished to inquire whether the appearance of the changing 
relations of events in time is compatible with the general nature of relations 
that he so carefully determined. Can the substances in McTaggart’s 
‘Absolute Reality’ form a compound substance that is in time? The question 
is misleading, but it is usually posed in this form so it might be enlightening 
to consider it in contrast to a more ‘McTaggartian’ formulation: can the 
substances in ‘Absolute Reality’ form a compound substance characterised 
by changing relations thereby constituting time? The former question depicts 
reality as something in time, like a rabbit in a hat, but according to 
McTaggart´s ontology any real entity, even time itself, must be either an 
existing substance, a property of an existing substance, a relation holding 
between existing substances or a compound substance constituted by 
substances who are the parts of reality: 
Having, as it seems to me, succeeded in proving that there can be no time 
without an A series, it remains to prove that an A series cannot exist, and that 
therefore time cannot exist. This would involve that time is not real at all, 
since it is admitted that the only way in which time can be real is by 
existing.56 
The second question implies just this: reality itself, or that part of it we are 
familiar with, must be temporal if time is to be real. Let us then not be 
confused by the choice between time being a compound substance or a 
relation because relations cannot exist independently of the substances that 
hold the relation. There can therefore not exist a relation that successively 
holds between different substances, but perhaps there can exist substances 
that hold different relations.  
According to McTaggart then, if there exist a temporal relation it must 
hold between two coexistent substances and thereby unite the substances it 
relates into a compound substance, i.e. an existing state of affairs. Given 
then that existence and reality are coextensive and neither allow of any 
degrees, how can anything existing have properties successively and hold a 
relation between the ‘times’ when it has these different properties without 
actually existing simultaneously in these different states? And how can time 
                                                
56 [italics are mine, RI] McTaggart (1988, vol. 2, sect. 325). 
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exist if the positions in time are positions that are held successively and 
therefore do not coexist? Broad indeed notices that McTaggart’s argument 
“[...]seems to presuppose that all events ‘co-exist’, and stand to each other 
timelessly or sempiternally in determinate relations of temporal 
precedence”.57 Broad gives a very well stated, and to my mind correct, 
account of McTaggart’s thoughts on this matter, but does not relate it to 
McTaggart’s argument on the ontological nature of relations in general. He 
presents it as a “[...]‘muddle’[... ]at the back of McTaggart’s mind”.58 But as 
we have seen McTaggart made it quite clear that the argument is entirely 
dependent on his ontology and there the dependence of relations on the 
coexistence of related terms is perfectly clear. Well, before we answer that 
question we need to be clear on the nature of the notions of positions, series 
of positions and moments of time involved in the ‘time-series.’ 
8. The sense of positions, series of positions, and moments of time 
In order to understand the notion of ‘series of positions’ we must first 
understand the ontological status of position. Positions are determined in 
terms of relations: being to the left to someone, being east of Eden, being 
fifth in line, earlier than e, etc. But relations cannot have independent 
existence in McTaggart’s ontology; they presuppose the existence of 
substances. Positions must therefore consist in the existence of a particular 
substance in a particular relation to other substances. I propose that for 
McTaggart a position should always be understood as a state of affairs. We 
are here considering temporal positions and they involve the position of 
events in a series of positions. Events are not by themselves temporal states 
of affairs, or temporal facts, according to McTaggart’s characterisation, 
because he believed that future, present and past are relations, and that 
events are therefore dependent for their temporality on having a relation to 
some other substance. It is evident that McTaggart believed that the 
substantiality of positions is provided by the events themselves and that 
positions can therefore not be existent apart from the existence of an event 
holding certain relations: 
                                                
57 Broad (1938, vol.2, p. 307).  
58 Broad (1938, vol.2, p. 299). 
Reference: Axiomathes 9(3): 287-306, 1998 (this is authors copy of original) 
The contents of any position in time form an event. The varied simultaneous 
contents of a single position are, of course, a plurality of events. But, like any 
other substance, they form a group, and this group is a compound 
substance.59  
Remember now that the relations of future, present and past do not hold 
mutually between the events but to something unknown. The positions of the 
A-series can therefore not consist solely of the simultaneous event-content, 
but also of an unknown entity outside the series of events and the relation 
holding between them; together they form a state of affairs. The place of that 
position in the series of positions must however be determined as the 
relation holding between the positions, or rather, between the successive 
states of affairs constituted by the different relations that the event-content 
holds to the unknown entity. Considering then what I granted as necessary 
conditions of successive possession of temporal properties, i.e. that the facts 
e is future, e is present and e is past, must obtain singularly at some time or 
other. These facts should be considered as different states of affairs 
constituted by e, an unknown entity and the relation that holds between 
them; these different states of affairs are the proper constitutive parts of the 
series of positions.  
The A-series is then a series of states of affairs, or a series of 
configurations of existing substances, that consist of the different relations 
that events hold to an unknown entity outside the series. It must now be clear 
that it was in a sense misleading to claim that events change positions, 
implying that they do this in a way analogous to how passengers change 
seats on the bus, because it is the events themselves that constitute the 
positions. Rather we should say that change in the A-series consists in the 
event successively constituting different positions when its relation to the 
unknown entity changes. The temporal characteristic of the series is 
provided by the events successively partaking in different states of affairs or 
configurations, and consequently being constituent parts of the states of 
affairs it partakes in. Each state of affairs or configuration has in its turn a 
position in the series of configurations and it is this series of configurations 
that McTaggart identifies with time.  
                                                
59 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 306). 
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We have now got an entity, time, that divides into parts of parts. First 
there is time as a totality, whose constituent parts are positions, i.e. states of 
affairs holding a relation to other states of affairs. The constituent parts of 
the positions are the events holding a certain relation to an unknown entity. 
Every event can be further divided into parts but we need not go further for 
our present purposes. If we now apply McTaggart’s ontology it will be clear 
that the reality of time, as a compound substance constituted by positions, is 
dependent on the coexistence of the positions; a compound substance is a 
compound of related substances and as we have seen relations require the 
coexistence of what is related. The existence and reality of the positions per 
se depend in their turn on that their constituent parts coexist in the relations 
required for being that position. This is however incompatible with events 
possessing temporal properties in succession, which in McTaggart’s view is 
equal to participating in different states of affairs. Being future is holding a 
certain relation to an unknown entity, being present is holding another 
relation to that same entity. Holding incompatible temporal relations in 
succession means that events must be constitutive parts of many, and 
mutually exclusive positions, or states of affairs; states of affairs they cannot 
coexist in.60  
Going from the bottom up: Events are required to be constitutive parts of 
many positions, if events cannot coexist in all these positions, then the 
positions fail to coexist in the required sense for constituting a series of 
positions, and time falls short of existence. It is thus demanded on the one 
hand that positions must coexist in time, which means that events must 
coexist in all the positions they are constituent parts of; but on the other hand 
it is also demanded that events be in different positions successively, which 
means that they cannot coexist in all the positions they are constituent parts 
of because succession excludes coexistence. I myself see no way to satisfy 
both these demands at the same time and have to conclude that they 
contradict each other. One of them will have to be rejected. If succession is 
rejected, we reject change and time, but if the other is rejected the reality of 
                                                
60 I have here characterised the contradiction in McTaggart’s sense as involving 
relations but it makes no difference if we would substitute the relations with properties, 
because properties are only real when held by an existing substance just as relations are 
only real when holding between existing substances.  
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time must be defined in some other terms than coexistence of constituent 
parts. 
Regarding the relationship of all this to moments of time, if they be taken 
as separate entities as they are in theories of ‘Absolute Time’, where 
moments of time are considered to be homogeneous entities of time 
‘containing’ the concrete event content. I will let it suffice to say that 
according to McTaggart’s ontology they must be substantial enough to hold 
the properties of future, present and past, properties they must aquire by 
holding a relation to something that is outside of time. And, because all 
substances hold relations to all other substances, they must be parts of the 
temporal states of affairs that constitute and determine positions in time. So, 
if we originally had a problem with the coexistence of singular events in 
three different positions, we are not going to get a smaller problem with the 
coexistence of different positions involving moments of time and the 
different relations they hold to events in addition to their relations to the 
unknown entity outside time. McTaggart grants, for the sake of argument, 
the possibility of moments of time being real entities distinct from events, 
but claims that this does not solve any problems because whatever holds 
regarding the temporality of events, holds regarding the temporality of 
moments of time.61 So whether the parts of time involve events, moments 
of time or positions do not really affect the conclusion, but granting the 
possibility of them all as separate entities and then trying to sort out the 
relations between them can maybe complicate the problem beyond 
recognizability. 
Let me summarize: According to McTaggart’s phenomenological 
analysis, time depends for its nature upon being constituted of successive 
parts, i.e. parts that do not coexist, but according to McTaggart’s ontology, 
time depends for its existence upon being constituted of coexistent parts.  
9. Time as a substance 
I hope I have made it quite clear that the argument for the unreality of time 
must be understood as a demonstration that time cannot be a substance, or 
alternatively, that substance cannot be temporal, given McTaggart’s 
                                                
61 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 327).  
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conception of what substances are like and how they relate to each other in 
‘Absolute Reality’. It is clear that all preconceived ideas about time as a 
‘dimension’ of change, or as some kind of objective relation independent of 
the events that are or come to be related by it, obscure proper understanding 
of McTaggart, and it is necessary to rid oneself of such prejudiced ideas of 
what is being dealt with before delving into the argument. Ideas of time as 
something apart from the substance in the universe are ruled out already in 
McTaggart’s ontology by the fundamental postulates that:  
(a) nothing can exist and thereby be real that is not a substance, 
or for its existence dependent upon substances,  
(b) every substance is in relation to all other substances,  
(c) relations can only hold between existing substances.  
Time must consequently be shown to be an existing whole if it is to be real 
at all: “By objectively real time, I mean a common time in which all existent 
things exist, so that they stand in temporal relations to each other.”62 The 
sense of ‘temporal’ is here quite simply ‘changing’. 
10. Conclusion 
In my opinion McTaggart did prove what he intended to prove in the 
argument for the unreality of time, i.e. that our conception of time is 
incompatible with a certain internally consistent systematisation of certain 
widely accepted notions regarding the nature of the constituents that 
supposedly are in time. This does not of course amount to proving that time 
actually is unreal, nor that tensed change is contradictory, although 
McTaggart himself came to this conclusion believing as he did in the truth of 
his ontology. I hope therefore that my account of McTaggart’s argument has 
shown that it does not provide a conclusive proof against either the A-view 
or the B-view, unless it can be shown that the proponents of these views 
hold the same ontology as McTaggart. I hope this detailed explanation may 
help the proponents of the A- and B-views to sort out their positions 
regarding the ontological status of the notions treated by McTaggart. I see no 
other way out of the presently stalemate situation. 
                                                
62 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, sect. 343). 
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I hope also to have succeeded in showing that McTaggart was not 
confused or mistaken concerning the proper use of temporal expressions, nor 
concerning the temporal characteristics of our experience. His understanding 
of these matters was not inadequate or mistaken in any way, but in fact 
exquisitely clear. He just rejected the belief that reality is as it appears to be. 
He claimed that there is another more fundamental reality beyond our 
experience, whose ontology he claimed to have determined. In his view this 
ontology was a measure of the truth of our beliefs about reality, beliefs that 
are derived from the merely apparently real.  
McTaggart did not in any way reject the experience of time, as a matter 
of fact the justification of the experience of time was absolutely necessary 
for the completeness of any theory about reality in McTaggart’s opinion. 
McTaggart believed that his  account of what he called the C-series, did 
explain how the experience of time and change could emerge in a timeless, 
changeless reality and thus establish time as a phenomenon bene fundatum; a 
well founded phenomenon.63 The terms of the C-series, which he claims to 
be a non-temporal series, stand in the transitive and asymmetric relations of 
included in and inclusive of, but this is not the place for an account of the C-
series.64  
McTaggart’s quest for a consistent ontology of the real and existing led 
him into an idealistic philosophical system that clashed with certain 
empirically grounded notions. Philosophical systems aiming to include 
everything often tend to clash with some of our well entrenched everyday 
notions. In McTaggart’s case, it proved to be, among other things, time. 
 
                                                
63 McTaggart (1988, vol.1, sect. 53, 613 & 619). 
64 McTaggart (1988, vol.2, Ch. 47-50). 
